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Abstract	  
China has implemented emissions trading schemes in seven cities and provinces, 
and is planning a national cap-and-trade scheme. The seven pilot schemes show 
marked differences in design and operate in very diverse economic circumstances. 
Challenges encountered in the pilot schemes include the risk of over-allocation of 
emissions permits, unpredictable underlying growth trends, robust measurement and 
verification procedures, and the interaction with regulation in the energy sector. In 
addition, experiences from developed countries’ emissions trading schemes, in 
particular the EU ETS, can help inform the decisions about the design of a future 
Chinese national scheme. Policymakers will need to pay particular attention to the 
operation of emissions trading in a heavily regulated electricity sector, to cap setting 
in the context of a national emissions intensity target and related price developments 
given uncertainty in underlying emissions growth rates, to the option of auctioning 
permits and using the proceeds for other purposes, and to implementing reliable 
systems for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions. This paper serves as 
an introduction to the special issue “Emissions trading in China” and draws on 
insights from the papers in the special issue. 
1. Introduction	  
China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Its economy is growing 
fast, energy intensity is high, and energy supply is dominated by coal. Consequently, 
China offers by far the largest potential for emissions reductions of any nation. 
China’s leadership has progressively strengthened its commitment to climate change 
mitigation. Although China insists on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the international climate negotiations, at home China is 
implementing ambitious policies to improve energy efficiency and switch from coal to 
cleaner energy sources, including renewable power. This is in line with a belief in the 
existence of global climate change by the vast majority of Chinese (Dai et al. 2014) 
Climate policy goes hand in hand with other Chinese policy objectives, in particular 
reducing local air pollution, improving energy security and attaining a leadership 
position in advanced manufacturing technologies. Various targets to 2020 for 
emissions, energy use and energy technologies reflect this. China appears on track 
to achieving these existing targets to 2020, but action commensurate with strong 
global climate change mitigation during the following decade will require a continued 
and increasing policy effort. 
Until recently, the Chinese climate policy repertoire has consisted almost exclusively 
of regulatory interventions, as well as state-directed investment. But China is 
preparing to give a role to market-based mechanisms for emissions control. Seven 
emissions pilot schemes covering over 260 million people got underway during 2013 
and 2014. The central government has announced that a national emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) will be implemented before 2020, and analysis on its design is 
understood to be underway. In creating such a scheme, China can draw on 
extensive international experiences, starting with the EU ETS, as well as the (now 
revoked) Australian carbon pricing mechanism, the Californian ETS, and schemes in 
Canada, the US East Coast states, and New Zealand.  
But making emissions pricing effective in China is incomparably more difficult than in 
any of the national and sub-national schemes already in operation. China’s economy 
still has strong elements of state control, and regulation is ubiquitous in the energy 
sector. Effective and cost-efficient emission pricing can only be achieved with energy 
market reform. And ahead of comprehensive market reform, there are complex 
challenges to be addressed.  
In this paper, we review emerging experiences with ETS in China and lessons from 
international experience, and draw some conclusions for the design of a national 
ETS for China. We base our review in large part on findings from the papers in this 
Special Issue of Energy Policy, which arose out of ongoing collaborations with 
researchers in China and developed countries including a workshop at the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim in November 2012 were most of 
the papers were presented.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss China’s emissions trends 
and targets, and underpinnings of China’s climate change policy. In Section 3 we 
review the design and early insights about the operation of some of the emissions 
trading pilot schemes. In Section 4 we review lessons from international emissions 
trading schemes that are of relevance to China. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Emissions	  trends,	  targets	  and	  underpinnings	  of	  China’s	  climate	  policy	  
Emissions	  trends	  and	  targets	  
China has been the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide since 2006. In 2011, 
China accounted for 21 per cent of global energy demand, 49 percent of global coal 
use by energy content and 26 percent of global energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions (IEA 2013a, b). China’s carbon dioxide emissions rose by 140 per cent 
between the year 2001 and 2011, on account of China’s exceptionally rapid 
economic growth, the energy intensive nature of economic growth during that 
particular period, and the fact that the carbon intensity of energy supply remained 
practically unchanged. China’s emissions growth has slowed in recent years and 
emissions intensity of the economy since 2005 is on a declining trend in line with 
China’s target to reduce emissions intensity by 40 to 45 per cent from 2005 to 2020 
(Table 1).  
China’s economy is highly carbon intensive. Carbon dioxide output per dollar of 
GDP, adjusted for purchasing power in 2011, was twice that of the United States and 
three times that of Europe - and even higher for GDP at exchange rates. The high 
emissions intensity is due firstly to a comparatively high energy intensity of GDP, on 
account of a high shares of heavy industries and capital investment, and because of 
relatively low average efficiency levels in energy use. Secondly, the relatively high 
carbon intensity of energy supply is driven by the dominance of coal.  
Both aspects provide great potential for improvement of China’s emissions intensity, 
and ultimately reductions in China’s absolute emissions levels. Wei et al. (2013) 
show that great energy and carbon abatement potential exist for Chinese thermal 
power enterprises. With appropriate policies, a peak in China’s carbon emissions in 
the 2020s or even earlier has been shown to be possible (Jiang 2013, Garnaut 
2014). For example, restructuring of growth towards high value manufacturing and 
services may be in the cards and would cause a significant slowdown in emissions 
growth even without additional policy effort.  
Table 1: China’s energy use, CO2 emissions from energy use and GDP, 2005-13 
 
 Annual growth (%) Index (2005 = 1) at 2013 
Energy/GDP −3.8a 0.74 
CO2/Energy −0.5a 0.96 
CO2/GDP −4.3 0.71 
GDP 10.1 2.16 
Energy 6.0 1.59 
CO2 5.4 1.52 
Sources: IEA (2013b) for data to 2011; Teng and Jotzo (2014) for 2012-2013 data.  
China’s	  climate	  policy	  	  framework	  
President Xi Jinping has stated that China should pursue a new mode of growth to 
promote ‘more efficient, equal and sustainable economic development’ (The 
Economist 2013). This does not appear to be just rhetoric but policy intent, and 
climate change mitigation plays a prominent part in the attempt to re-define Chinese 
economic growth. 
Climate policy goes hand in hand with other Chinese policy objectives, in particular 
reducing local air pollution, improving energy security and attaining a leadership 
position in advanced manufacturing technologies (Boyd 2012). Urban air pollution is 
taking an increasingly stark toll in terms of health impacts and is driving policies to 
cut coal combustion in urban areas in the coastal areas and Beijing.  
There is also an increasing understanding that reducing the share of fossil fuels in 
the energy system will reduce the exposure of the economy to energy price shocks, 
and that higher energy productivity may have positive economy-wide effects (Teng 
and Jotzo 2014). A host of regulatory interventions to improve energy efficiency and 
reduce the carbon intensity of China’s energy system is in place. One example is the 
mandatory energy-saving and emission-reduction program launched as part of the 
11th National Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), which generated notable improvements 
in energy efficiency and environmental quality (Levine et al. 2010). 
But China is preparing to give a role to market-based mechanisms for emissions 
control. Seven emissions pilot schemes are in place (see Section 3). The central 
government has announced that a national emissions trading scheme (ETS) will be 
implemented before the end of the decade (Zhang et al. this issue). The China-based 
expert community has a strong expectation that an ETS, and perhaps also a carbon 
tax, will be in place by the year 2020 (Jotzo et al. 2013).  
Emissions	  trading	  in	  a	  highly	  regulated	  energy	  sector	  
China’s leadership has stated that it intends to continue and accelerate the process 
of giving markets a greater role in the economy, but the challenges of putting the 
energy sector on a market footing are enormous. Work is underway within the 
bureaucracy to decide the design parameters of a national ETS. But making 
emissions pricing effective in China is incomparably more difficult than in any of the 
national and sub-national schemes already in operation.  
China’s economy still has strong elements of state control, in particular in the energy 
sector, which is a key sector for successful emissions trading. Although a gradual 
process of deregulation is underway, regulation remains ubiquitous, including for 
energy prices and operational aspects such as dispatch times for power stations, and 
many of the largest corporate players are state-owned.  
Making emissions trading work in these circumstances is a challenge for scheme 
design (Howes and Dobes 2010, Baron et al 2012). Full effectiveness and cost-
efficiency can only be achieved with energy market reform. Teng et al (this issue) 
assess the institutional barriers to an effective ETS in China inherent in China’s 
current electricity market model. They find major challenges from the “equal share” 
dispatching model for power stations and from regulated electricity pricing. They 
suggest that in the short term, ahead of price liberalization, emissions pricing in 
China could proceed as a “supply side” model with an “energy saving” model of 
electricity dispatch from generators. Li et al (this issue) find that rigid electricity prices 
mean that carbon pricing is less effective than it would otherwise be, but consider 
that the existing regulated electricity sector is a feasible starting point.  
The discussions of a suitable ETS structure for China can also learn from Korea, 
which is planning a national ETS and where Electricity markets are strictly controlled 
by governments as well. Park and Hong (this issue) discuss the consequences of 
cheap electricity price controlled by the government in the implementation of a 
possible Korean ETS. The strictly regulated electricity price blocks the cost pass-
through not only in the electricity trading market but also in the carbon market. This 
leads to the suggestion to apply intensity measures exclusively for the power sector, 
while an absolute emission cap is applied to the rest of the regulated sectors. Park 
and Hong conclude that this type of decoupled rules can never be an effective 
solution for accomplishing the national abatement target. They call for price 
deregulation and a focus on the “fundamental spirit of market mechanisms”.  
In order to achieve market efficiency even in the presence of market imperfections 
and price and quantity controls in the electricity market, Kim and Lim (this issue) 
recommend a particular policy mix. They argue that a cap-and-trade regulatory 
system for indirect emissions combined with relative (intensity) targets for direct 
emissions can achieve market efficiency. It provides price incentives for consumers 
to adjust their electricity consumption in line with an efficient allocation of other types 
of energy. While intensity regulation provides mitigation incentives to power 
producers, the output subsidy effect of rate-based updating allocation helps prevent 
the double burden of carbon costs on electricity consumers. Kim and Lim suggest 
that policy proposals have to be studied carefully to prevent double regulation and 
higher administrative costs. 
 
 
3. China’s	  ETS	  pilot	  schemes	  
The Chinese government announced its intent to establish emissions trading in 2011, 
and moved quickly to establish seven regional emissions trading schemes: in the 
provinces of Guangdong and Hubei, and the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Chongqing and Shenzhen. Together, the seven pilot schemes cover a population of 
over 260 million people and almost 1.8 trillion dollars in 2010 (Zhang et al this issue).  
The pilot schemes cover a wide range of different economic circumstances, from 
Hubei as a relatively less developed region with an economic structure dominated by 
heavy industry, to the high-income coastal cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen 
whose economies are dominated by services and some manufacturing. Average 
levels of income, energy use and emissions differ greatly (Table 2).   
The design features of some of the pilot schemes are similar in important respects, 
for example all give out most of the permits for free in the initial stages. But they 
differ in other important dimensions, for example with regard to the coverage of the 
schemes, trading rules and provisions for price stabilization. These aspects are 
explored further below and in several papers in this special issue. 
The differences in context and scheme design are deliberate. As Zhang et al (this 
issue) observe, they are “an important experiment and learning opportunity that will 
shape a potential future national ETS”.  
Table 2: Basic indicators for provinces and cities with pilot schemes 
 Populatio
n 
(million) 
GDP  
(RMB 
billion) 
GDP per 
capita 
(RMB 
1000's) 
Energy 
use 
(million 
tonnes 
SCE) 
Energy 
use per 
capita 
(tonnes 
SCE/ 
person) 
Carbon 
dioxide 
emission 
(million 
tonnes) 
Emis-
sions 
per 
capita 
(tCO2/
person
/year) 
Emis-
sions 
intensity 
(gCO2/ 
RMB) 
Shenzhen 
SEZ 10 903 87 49 4.7 83.4 8.3 92 
Beijing 20 1182 60 70 3.5 103 5.2 87 
Tianjin 13 781 60 68 5.3 134 10.3 172 
Shanghai 23 1556 68 112 4.9 211 9.2 136 
Chongqing 29 616 21 79 2.7 125 4.3 203 
Hubei 57 1250 22 151 2.6 320 5.6 256 
Guangdong 104 4016 39 269 2.6 444 4.3 110 
China 1341 31234 23 3895 2.9 8146 6.1 261 
Pilot 
schemes 
combined 
256 10303 40 798 3.5 1253 4.9 122 
Pilot 
schemes 
share of 
national total 
19% 33%   20%   16%     
Source: Jotzo (2013).  
Coverage	  
An unusual feature in all Chinese pilot ETS is that they cover not just direct 
emissions from fossil fuel use; but, also emissions attributable to electricity use within 
each city or province with a pilot scheme, including from electricity generated outside 
the scheme. In the case of some of the city ETS, these indirect emissions account for 
a large share of emissions covered (Wu et al this issue, Jiang et al this issue, Zhang 
et al this issue). 
In practice, this means that large electricity users – principally manufacturers and 
large buildings – have a permit liability for their electricity use. Hence, they face a 
somewhat higher effective electricity price than would otherwise be the case. Their 
effective electricity price is also higher than the price of their competitors outside of 
the pilot schemes or those that fall below the size threshold for inclusion. Whether 
and to what extent this price signal influences operations and investment decisions 
remains unclear.  
The thresholds for coverage vary greatly between schemes, with Hubei having a very 
high threshold of 120 kt CO2 per year, and at the other end of the scale Shenzhen 
with a threshold of just 5 kt. This compares to a threshold of 25 kt CO2-equivalent in 
the EU ETS. A higher threshold means a smaller number of participants in the 
scheme and lower total transaction costs, yet it reduces the share of overall 
emissions covered by the emissions price.  
Shenzhen has implemented the broadest coverage of emissions, including all direct 
and indirect emissions from all industrial sectors, as well as the buildings and the 
transport sector. As Jiang et al (this issue) point out, this is a significant innovation. 
However, it means there is a large number of liable entities (over 800) accounting for 
a relatively modest absolute amount of emissions (32 million tonnes of CO2-
equivalent per year), with obvious questions about cost-effectiveness.   
Hubei meanwhile is the world’s third largest emissions trading scheme, even though 
only 138 emitters are covered by it (Qi et al this issue). Heavy industries including 
steel, chemicals, refining and cement, along with power generation, dominate the 
province’s economy and the trading scheme.  
None of the schemes includes “upstream” coverage, i.e., imposing the liability to 
acquit permits on the providers of fossil fuels higher up in the supply chain, such as 
coal mines, oil refineries or gas distributors. This approach was taken in part of the 
Australian carbon pricing scheme, namely for the use of natural gas in smaller 
commercial installations and by households (Jotzo 2012). Upstream coverage can 
drastically reduce the number of companies covered by a scheme.  
Upstream coverage could be an attractive feature for China’s national ETS in order 
to minimize potential problems with emissions monitoring and verification. But this 
relies on upstream fuel suppliers being able to pass on the costs of carbon permits to 
their downstream customers. At present this is not consistently the case in China’s 
fossil fuel using industries. In contrast to the EU ETS where installations are the unit 
of coverage, in the Chinese pilots it is companies that are the legal entity for permit 
liability.  
Cap	  setting	  	  
The cap (total amount of permits issued) is a key aspect of any ETS. Together with 
underlying emissions growth and abatement options, it determines the scarcity of 
permits and hence the trading price. Different approaches have been taken in the 
pilot schemes.  
Some examples illustrate the variety of approaches taken, and the difficulties that 
pilot schemes have grappled with. The pilot ETS generally do not have clearly 
defined emissions targets. The province (or city) level emissions targets for 2015 
allocated by the central government are not necessarily seen as binding, and in any 
case the pilot ETS cover only a share of the overall emissions in each province or 
city. Furthermore, there are pressures clearly for the ETS cap not to unreasonably 
constrain the expansion of industrial activities in the pilot jurisdictions.  
Out of this arises an approach whereby caps are constructed in a “bottom-up” 
fashion from sector-level benchmarks and growth rates, and the total number of 
allowances issued in this way adds up to the cap in the scheme. This inverts the 
approach that would normally be taken where the role of an ETS is the principal 
means of achieving a given overall emissions target; namely, to set a cap first and 
then allocate permits to emitters.  
The Shanghai ETS is an example. As Wu et al (this issue) explain, the allocations for 
key industries covered by the scheme are calculated according to emission 
benchmarks (a standardized amount of emissions per unit of production), multiplied 
by their average activity level over the period 2009 to 2011. The local government 
retains discretionary powers however, as it can adjust the allowances to industries 
and companies according to a range of factors.  
Shenzhen has opted for a more complex model of an intensity-based cap determined 
on the basis of sector-level targets for emissions intensity reduction, benchmarks, 
and projections of future output (Jiang et al this issue). This provides an automatic 
stabilizer, as the cap will expand in line with projected output in the following year. 
The Hubei scheme adopts a ‘hybrid’ system of cap determination, based on 
projected growth as well as the possibility of adjustments to the cap, however here 
this is based on ex-post adjustment in light of realized activity levels (for power 
generators) (Qi et al this issue).  
Permit	  allocation	  
All pilot schemes to date have allocated the large majority – or all of – the permits for 
free to companies that are covered by the schemes. Several of the schemes retain a 
small share of the overall amount of permits as a reserve, to be issued into the 
market if the market price were to become unexpectedly or unacceptably high. Such 
an “allowance reserve” is a feature also in the Californian ETS.  
There are strong arguments in favor of auctioning a significant share of the permits 
and for governments to use the revenue to support other programs or to lower other 
taxes. This is done in the third phase of the EU ETS and as was done from the start 
of the Australian and Californian schemes. Numerous theoretical and empirical 
modelling analyses have shown that well targeted revenue recycling can reduce the 
economic costs of achieving emissions reductions through ETS or carbon taxes. In 
some cases, there may even be a “double dividend” of economic gains as well as 
environmental gains (Goulder 1995).  
For China’s case, this is illustrated with simulations of a reduction in consumption 
and production taxes, paid for out of carbon pricing revenues (Li et al this issue). 
They point out, however, that their optimal policy settings can only be achieved under 
a de-regulated electricity market, allowing carbon cost pass through from generators 
to electricity users. Cao (2013) also found significant potential benefits of different 
forms of tax change in China linked to the revenues from a carbon tax.  
Nevertheless, for the Chinese pilot schemes, it appears that the revenue-raising 
prospects of the schemes have not been an important consideration in the face of 
concerns about impacts on the profitability of companies covered by the schemes. It 
is commonplace for companies to exert political pressure on governments for the 
issuance of free permits under emissions trading schemes. Equally, however, once it 
is observed that an ETS does not have a significant adverse effect on industry, this 
can open the door to auctioning of permits.  
To what extent permits will be auctioned and revenue retained, and which emitters 
will be given free permits and on what basis, is a key consideration for a national 
ETS. Hübler et al (this issue) analyses the impacts of the introduction of a national 
ETS in China on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries as they are 
potentially prone to carbon leakage, i.e. their relocation to countries with less strict 
climate policies. While several sectors are affected only moderately by the 
introduction of an ETS, some industries (e.g. electricity, aluminum, other non-ferrous 
metals) experience non-negligible production losses. Full auctioning of allowances 
leads to much greater sectoral output reductions. At the macroeconomic level, the 
sectoral output reductions are compensated by revenues from auctioning. The 
choice between auctioning and free allocation of allowances has only minor 
implications for the Chinese macroeconomy given lump-sum revenue transfers.  
Implementation	  of	  the	  pilot	  schemes	  
The time from announcement to implementation of the Chinese pilot schemes was 
short relative to international experience such as the EU ETS and Australia. The 
relatively fast startup of the pilots is remarkable in light of the fact that very little pre-
existing institutional knowledge and few experts were available, and that there are 
significant hurdles to overcome regarding overlapping jurisdictions and the absence 
of monitoring of emissions levels and monitoring procedures.  
Not all of these issues are addressed fully at the start of pilot schemes, with further 
learning being a deliberate aspect.  This has led to some uncertainties affecting the 
operation of the schemes. As Wu et al (this issue) point out for the case of Shanghai, 
there are significant uncertainties in the pilot schemes, arising from cap setting 
procedures, their relationship to growth trajectories, the extent of emissions 
reductions possible, as well as the largely untested provisions for monitoring, 
reporting and verification.  
To some extent, such uncertainties are unavoidable at the start of an ETS. The ‘pilot’ 
nature of the existing regionally based ETS makes allowance for such uncertainties. 
Experience accumulates rapidly in the pilots, and can inform the design of a national 
scheme. In other respects, the lack of clarity results in avoidable policy uncertainty. 
Governments can minimize uncertainties by fully spelling out the provisions for the 
scheme, especially scheme caps and/or the rules that will determine scheme caps in 
future years.  
Trading volumes have been relatively low in the first months of operation of most of 
the pilots. Indications that liable entities are treating the schemes largely as 
compliance markets, as evident in a spike in trading volumes just before the due date 
for permit acquittal in the Beijing scheme. The exception is Hubei, where trading is 
open to financial investors, and where institutional investors were allowed to take 
part in the first round bidding before the start of the market (Qi et al this issue).  
Finally, institutional and operational aspects are crucial to the successful 
implementation. In particular, monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions has 
presented major difficulties in the pilot ETS. The necessary frameworks and 
procedures on the whole did not exist at the introduction of the pilots, and systems 
are being refined during the operation of the pilots. A national scheme will be able to 
draw on the practical experiences being made in the pilot schemes. 
 
 
4. Insights	  for	  a	  national	  scheme	  from	  international	  experience	  	  
In developing a national ETS, China can observe experiences and draw on a large 
body of analysis done on options for and features of existing ETS in Western 
countries. In this special issue, some issues of international experience of potential 
relevance for China are covered.  
Uncertainty	  and	  policy	  interaction	  
Unexpectedly low prices and reduction efforts now characterize the EU ETS, since 
the decline in European economic growth rates and growth outlook in the early 
2010s, and given strong regulatory and subsidy policies in some European countries. 
As de Perthuis and Trotignon (this issue) argue, the EU ETS “has been undermined 
variously by the weakness of its regulation, an undesirable overlap with other public 
policies and the far-reaching economic and financial crisis that caused the market 
price of allowances to plunge.”  
One important aspect of the EU experience has been the interaction of the ETS with 
other policies that also serve to reduce emissions, and so reduce efforts required to 
stay within the cap prescribed by an ETS. Flues et al (this issue) investigate the 
effects of alternative scenarios for electricity demand, and interactions between the 
EU ETS and renewable energy support policies. They find that there can be severe 
and costly consequences of policy interaction when aggregate electricity demand is 
low, and that the presence of fixed renewable energy support policies makes ETS 
permit prices more sensitive to changes in economic activity.  
Cap	  setting	  
In an ETS, a pre-announced future trajectory of caps assists market predictability. On 
the other hand, a fixed trajectory of caps may result in the scheme requiring 
unexpectedly greater mitigation efforts, at higher than expected permit prices, if 
underlying emissions growth is higher than expected; or unexpectedly lower efforts 
and prices if underlying growth is weak.  
If China’s cap were set according to an intensity standard, the economic growth 
related uncertainty about permit prices could be reduced. Hübler et al (this issue) 
evaluate policy design options for a China ETS taking into account uncertainty about 
future growth. In their simulations higher Chinese economic growth slightly increases 
mitigation costs under the intensity target in 2020. However, under the fixed 
emissions cap in 2030, the results are sensitive to the assumptions on Chinese 
economic growth.. 
There are different views on whether unexpectedly low or high prices are a problem 
to be rectified or not. A large literature argues that a hybrid approach between price 
and quantity control is desirable. This could be achieved through a combination of 
price floor and price ceiling, keeping the permit price in a corridor. California’s 
scheme has a price floor implemented by way of reserve price at auction, and a price 
floor was also planned for the Australian scheme. Most ETS have an implicit price 
ceiling in the form of a compliance penalty. Given large uncertainties about China’s 
future underlying emissions trajectory, the effect of other policy measures and the 
response of the economy to a carbon price, an argument can be made for price 
corridors (price floors and ceilings) in a Chinese national ETS (Jotzo 2013).  
Another approach is for caps to be adjusted in light of market, economic and 
technological developments. Australia had a system of “rolling caps” whereby a 
trajectory of caps was fixed for five years, with indicative caps beyond this time, and 
an independent authority to advise government on the setting of the cap each year 
beyond that. 
De Perthuis and Trotignon (this issue) argue for an approach that hands the setting 
of caps to an independent authority, which has full regulatory powers and acts 
according to a governance framework and clearly expressed long term goals, but full 
discretion for the authority to react to short term. There are parallels with the setting 
of monetary policy by a central bank. 
5. Conclusions	  
China’s planned move towards national emissions trading is a highly ambitious 
undertaking. It is fraught with difficulty as it takes place in a still highly regulated 
energy sector and in the context of a host of regulatory policies to constrain 
emissions growth. At the same time, it provides great opportunity for China’s 
environmental policy to be based on market instruments, and for China to take global 
leadership on putting a price tag on pollution.  
The emissions trading pilot schemes now underway in China can provide valuable 
experiences for the design of a national scheme. Likewise, China can benefit from 
the experiences made with emissions trading in Western countries.  
In this paper, we summarize some of these emerging experiences, with a focus on 
recapitulating and interpreting the insights from papers in this special issue of Energy 
Policy, ‘Emissions trading in China’.  
We find that policymakers will need to pay particular attention to the operation of 
emissions trading in a heavily regulated electricity sector. Setting emission caps in 
the context of a national emissions intensity target creates specific difficulties. 
Related price developments are uncertain and depend to a large extent on 
underlying emissions growth rates. The option of auctioning permits and using the 
proceeds for other purposes is not taken into consideration extensively. Finally, 
implementing reliable systems for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions 
remains a major task for policymakers in China. 
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